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How we interpret information and assign blame for bad outcomes is one of the most 
common and natural of human activities. It’s a familiar tale for most of us: Reading the 
newspaper in the morning and haggling over who’s to blame for some scandal. Most of us 
may never act on outcomes we find blameworthy, but some of us may take actions. This 
thesis investigates these everyday actions from multiple angles. 
 
The thesis started out as an unwanted child but ended up as a love project. I want to thank 
Professor Einar Breivik for his patience as a workaholic tried to negotiate enough free time 
for himself to finish the thesis. I also want to thank my significant other, Charlotte, for her 
support during stressful times. Lastly, I want to thank my parents for nurturing my curiosity 







This master thesis reports the result of an experiment on laypersons attribution of blame and 
evaluation of moral wrongness in the aftermath of money laundering transgressions by a 
bank. We manipulate two key variables of theoretical and practical interest. First, we 
manipulate whether the bank choose to self-report the transgressions, or a newspaper 
discovers the activity and report it. Second, we manipulate whether the money laundering 
transgressions took place close to the participants home (low social distance) or in a foreign 
country (high social distance). To test our hypotheses, we conduct a survey-experiment on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk with 181 US citizens.  
 
We find that the bank’s reporting choice significantly impacts attribution of blame through 
its effect on attribution of intent to the bank for the money laundering transgressions. 
However, we do not find that social distance impacts either attribution of blame or 
evaluation of the moral wrongness of the money laundering transgressions. Furthermore, we 
find that participants prior attitudes towards the harm of money laundering significantly 
impacts both attribution of blame directly and through their effect on attribution of intent and 
causation to the bank for the transgressions.  
 
In addition, we find that participants’ willingness to change their bank affiliation after 
revelation of the bank’s role in the money laundering activity is significantly impacted by 
their moral identity. Of further interest is the finding that the bank’s reporting choice (Self-
reporting the transgressions, or the later discovery and reporting of journalists) also impacted 
the willingness to change bank affiliation. Banks who choose to come clean receive 
substantial credit in the public both when blame is attributed and when the layperson choose 
whether they want to continue the customer relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
Money laundering is the act of giving dirty money a legitimate appearance. It’s a process of 
converting or transferring the asset with the knowledge that it derives from a criminal 
source, with an aim to conceal that criminal source or aid the criminal involved in 
committing the crime (Tiwari, Gepp & Kumar, 2020). Money laundering may negatively 
affect a country’s economy by increasing criminal activities, especially organized crime, and 
provide growth stimulus to the shadow economy which impede tax collection and leads to 
revenue loss for state- and local governments (Hendriyetty & Grewal, 2017). 
Commercial banks may act as important intermediators in money laundering schemes by 
allowing criminal funds to transfer across borders undetected (Simwayi & Guohua, 2011). 
Banks have received increasing scrutiny in the last decades as the global fight against money 
laundering, terrorism and organized crime has intensified. Anti-money laundering 
enforcement relies on bank reporting to law enforcement and government agencies about 
suspicious transactions. Banks are further required to incur costly screening, monitoring, and 
reporting with the threat of government sanctions if found noncompliant (Takats, 2009).1 
Another threat of noncompliance is the implicit reputation cost of being publicly known for 
money laundering transgression. This thesis investigates one part of this reputation cost for 
banks: Customers reaction to money laundering transgressions.  
We investigate bank customers reaction to money laundering transgression with an 2x2 
between subject experiment on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform with 181 American 
participants. Our hypotheses are developed from the culpable control model (Alicke, 2000), 
moral identity research (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) and recent research on how social 
distance impacts moral attribution and action (e.g., Gilead, Ben David & Ecker, 2017). We 
manipulate whether the money laundering transgressions where self-reported by the bank to 
the authorities or reported by an investigative news team. Furthermore, we manipulate 
whether the transgressions took place in the US or in Mexico.  
 
1 Sanctions include the costs of public law enforcement actions (cease and desist orders or written agreements), the costs of 
private law enforcement actions (memoranda of understanding), and implicit reputation costs. For example, banks are fined 
if suspicious activity detection and reporting procedures are not in place. Yet, the test of these policies is whether banks are 
able to identify and report those transactions which are considered to be suspicious ex post. (Takats, 2009, p.33-34).  
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According to the culpable control model banks who self-report their transgressions will be 
perceived as acting with less intent and have less responsibility for the illegal activity, 
compared to when a third-party, like a journalist, discover and report the transgressions. We 
find that when the bank’s money laundering transgressions was discovered and reported by a 
newspaper, the bank was attributed significantly more intent for the transgression, leading to 
significantly more blame, than when the bank choose to self-report the same transgressions. 
We further find that prior attitudes about the harm of money laundering directly affects 
attributed blame to the bank, but also impacts blame through its effect on attributed intent 
and causation. However, we do not find that social distance impacts participants attribution 
of blame or their moral evaluation of the transgressions.  
 
We also investigated whether participants’ moral identity would impact how they acted on 
the information about the bank’s transgressions. We find strong evidence to this effect, as 
participants with higher moral identity was significantly more likely to be willing to change 
bank affiliation if their current bank committed similar transgressions. We further find that 
participants were more likely to be willing to change bank affiliation if a journalist 
discovered and reported the transgressions (all else being equal), which point to the cost for 
banks if they do not opt for transparency. 
Our results reveal the important role played by bank customers prior attitudes and identities 
when trying to understand how they will react to revelations of financial crime. It provides 
an important contribution to research on banks corporate social responsibility and reputation 
building (e.g, McDonald & Rundle‐Thiele, 2008; Dell’Atti, Trotta, Iannuzzi & Demaria, 
2017). In addition, the results reveal the critical role banks’ reporting choices can have for 
later juror behaviour in civil actions after money laundering transgressions. As such, the 
thesis adds to the growing literature on juror behaviour (See Levett, Danielsen, Kovera, & 
Cutler, 2005, for a review). Lastly, the results reveal a significant role for regulators in 
communicating broadly the harm of money laundering activity, as we found prior attitudes 
towards the harm a key predictor variable in attribution of blame. 
This thesis will have the following structure: The next section (Section 2) will outline our 
hypotheses, while the experimental design, case and sample are explained in Section 3. Then 
follows our results and analysis in Section 4, while we provide a concluding discussion in 
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Section 5. Figures and output from the mediation analysis can be found in Section 6, while 
the experimental material is available in the Appendix.  
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2. Background and Theory 
2.1 Culpable control model 
2.1.1 Introduction 
When individuals or companies violate norms, they risk receiving blame from their 
surroundings (Byrne, 2016). The culpable control model (Alicke, 2000) asserts that 
attribution of blame is based on three factors: causation (behavioral criteria), intention 
(mental criteria), and spontaneous evaluation.  
 
According to the culpable control model, spontaneous evaluative reactions evoke a blame 
validation mode of processing in which observers align the mental and behavioral criteria in 
a manner that supports their desire to blame the source of their reactions. The culpable 
control model assumes that observers’ evaluative or affective reactions to the actor’s 
motives, character, actions, and the outcomes that ensue influence judgments about the 
mental (intentions, roughly “mens rea”) and behavioral (causation, roughly “actus reus”) 
criteria that legal scholars prescribe for blame (Alicke, 2000; Alicke, Buckingham, Zell & 
Davis, 2008; Rogers et al., 2019). 
2.1.2 Causation 
When thinking about the causes of an event individuals will unconsciously and automatically 
construe the counterfactual (Byrne, 2016). If the individual or firm could have acted 
differently, they are usually assigned more blame (Alicke et al., 2008; Alicke, Rose & 
Bloom, 2011). However, people’s perception of causation is consistently influenced by 
information about the actor’s positive or negative character, motives, or behavior (e.g., 
Alicke, 1992, Alicke & Zell, 2009; Alicke et al., 2011), as well as by the character of the 
victim (e.g. Alicke & Davis, 1989; Alicke et al., 2008) and the nature of the consequences 
(e.g. Alicke et al., 2011; Mazzocco & Alicke, 2004). In addition, individuals seem to not 
imagine an alternative to actions that leads to a bad outcome when the action itself conforms 
to a moral norm or obligation (McCloy & Byrne, 2000; Walsh & Byrne, 2007).  In such 
cases, actors are in line with the culpable control model blamed less. 
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In sum, there is an interaction between spontaneous negative evaluations and mutability, 
where mutability leads to more blame and causal attribution if the individual or firm actions 
(or passivity) arouses spontaneous negative evaluations (Alicke et al., 2008).  
2.1.3 Intention 
People or firms who cause harm with intent receive more blame for the outcome (e.g., Ames 
& Fiske, 2013, 2015; Fincham & Shultz, 1981).  
The culpable control model separates between intention of action and intention of outcome 
(Alicke, 2000). Intention of action refers to whether the actor behaved knowingly, 
purposively, and without external constraint, while intention of outcome refers to the actor’s 
state of mind regarding the ultimate consequences (where they desired or foreseen). Actors 
are generally blamed less for harmful consequences when one or both elements of 
intentional actions are missing (Alicke, 2000; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003; 
Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009; Rogers et al., 2019).  
 
Since intentions are generally hidden from the perceptions of others, attributions of intent are 
especially susceptible to spontaneous evaluations (Roger et al., 2019). As with the causal 
element in the culpable control model, attributions of intent have been found to be 
influenced by of e.g., moral disapproval, the actor’s character, race (racial bias) and social 
group (Knobe, 2003a; Roger et al., 2019). Furthermore, knowledge attributions to the actor 
are typically higher when the outcome involves harmful consequences (Knobe, 2003b), 
which leads to stronger perceptions of actor’s intent (Knobe, 2003a; 2003b; 2004).  
2.1.4 Hypotheses 
In the case of money laundering transgressions, the bank is not the only actor involved in the 
norm violation. How blame is attributed between the criminal agent and the bank can be 
predicted based on several factors derived from the culpable control model. 
 
(1) Intent and causation will be inferred from the bank’s public actions. We expect self-
reported transgressions to be perceived as indicative of more unintentional error on part of 
the bank. While the bank could act differently (there exist a counterfactual: “Not accepting 
the customer”), the bank’s causal and intentional role is likely less prominent due to the 
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perception of taking responsibility. At the opposite end is the active concealment on part of 
the bank, and the later revelation of the transgressions by media and/or government 
regulators. The active concealment is expected to be perceived as intentional involvement in 
the money laundering transgressions. We therefor expect that the bank’s transparency will 
impact people’s perception of the bank’s intent and causal role with regards to the money 
laundering transgressions. 
 
(2) Attribution of blame will be higher when the bank is perceived to be acting with greater 
intent and have more responsibility (causal role) for the money laundering transgressions. 
 
(3) We expect people who have stronger beliefs about the harmful effects of money 
laundering transgressions to have a higher likelihood of activating a blame validation mode 
which would lead to stronger perception of intent and causation on part of the bank. We 
therefor expect that prior attitudes towards the harm of money laundering transgression will 
increase perception of intent and causation and lead to higher attribution of blame to the 
bank.  
 
In sum, we postulate three hypotheses based on the above discussion: 
 
H1a: Attribution of causality and intent to the bank will be higher when the bank 
conceals the money laundering transgressions. 
 
H1b: The bank will be blamed to a greater extent when the bank conceals the money 
laundering transgressions. Participants’ attribution of intent and causality will 
mediate the effect. 
 
H1b: The bank will be attributed blame to a greater extent by participant with a 
stronger attitude towards the harm of money laundering. Participant’s attribution of 
intent and causality will mediate part of the effect. 
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2.2 Blame validation: Social distance and political ideology 
Morality can be said to serve a social function (Haidt, 2001; 2007). The perceived morality 
of actions therefor depends not only on the specificity of the actions themselves, but also on 
the relational context in which those actions occur (e.g. Earp, McLoughlin, Monrad, Clark & 
Crockett, 2021). However, most moral theories to date have not considered who is doing the 
action and to whom, and how this may significantly impact moral judgments.2 This is 
peculiar, as research suggest humans share a lot more concern with the moral life of our 
neighbors, than the fate of individuals perceived as socially distant from us (e.g., Cikara, 
Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Duclos & Barasch, 2014; Tronto, 1993).  
 
Social distance has been found to impact more our evaluation of omission type of acts than 
of harmful acts (Gilead et al., 2017). For example, people react more strongly to human 
trafficking in Africa than of children dying out of dirty water and preventable disease 
(Gilead et al., 2017). Money laundering may be considered an act of omission on part of the 
bank (lack of care) necessitated by harmful acts such as drug-, human or gun trafficking. As 
such we predict that social distance will decrease participants attribution of blame and 
punishment to the bank due to less negative spontaneous evaluations. 
2.2.1 Hypotheses 
Based on the above discussion we postulate two hypotheses to be tested: 
H2a: Participants will judge money laundering activity commited through a foreign 
branch less harshly than similar activity in their local branch.  
Right-wing politics exhibit a more harm-based morality with ideology focused more on law 
and order and protection of negative rights (e.g. property rights). 3 We therefor predict that 
participants with a political standing more to the right, will reduce their moral evaluation of 
money laundering activity committed through a foreign branch more than their more liberal 
counterparts. 
 
2 See Bloom (2011) for a discussion of what is lost when morality is investigated through the behavior of strangers instead 
of through the behavior of family, friends, co-workers etc. 
3 Se e.g. Ayn Rand (1964). 
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H2b: Participants identifying as more conservative will exhibit a stronger pattern in 
H2a than participants identifying as more liberal. 
2.3 Moral identity 
A person’s moral identity can be understood as an organized cognitive representation of 
moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino & 
Freeman, 2008). This perspective on moral identity assumes that the moral identity of a 
person is more central to his or her self-definition as an individual if the moral knowledge 
structures are more readily accessible and available for processing of social information 
(Shao et al., 2008).   
As individuals strive to maintain self-consistency between their different self-definitions 
(e.g., Festinger 1957), individuals can be assumed to act according to their moral identity 
when its activated and of sufficient strength. However, it is also assumed that moral 
identities occupy different levels of importance in people’s self-definitions (Aquino & Reed, 
2002). Furthermore, in situations where other cues are strong (such as financial rewards), 
other aspects of an individual’s identity may be activated, and the influence of the moral 
identity may be diminished (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim & Felps, 2009). 
2.3.1 Hypotheses 
When asked about their willingness to change bank affiliation based on money laundering 
transgressions, we expect that an individuals’ moral identity will be activated and lead to 
higher willingness to change their bank affiliation. 4 
H3a: Participants with stronger moral identity will exhibit higher willingness to 
change their bank affiliation. 
At the same time, experimental research is mixed on whether people’s moral sense of self 
does extend to socially distant others (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
 
4 Whether individuals in a real situation will act according to the self-importance of their moral identity would likely 
depend on the strength of their moral identity, whether the social cues in the situation elicit other identities and if the 
financial rewards are sufficiently strong to bias against moral activation (Shao et al. 2008). This line of inquiry will not be 
investigated in this paper. 
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Strongman, 1999; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reese, Berthold, & Steffens, 2012). Moral identity 
of sufficient strength has been found to have predictive value for e.g., charitable giving (e.g. 
Winterich, Mittal & Aquino, 2013) and reactions to harm based acts such as war or torture 
(Aquino, Reed, Thau & Freeman, 2007; Smith, Aquino & Koleva, 2014), and both could 
depending on the circumstance be evaluated as out-group moral behavior. However, in line 
with research on social distance we predict that omission-based acts will elicit less activation 
of the moral identity, and especially so when social distance is large. 
H3b: Participants’ moral identity will not interact with social distance on willingness 
to change bank affiliation. 
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3. Sample and experimental design 
3.1 Sample 
Participants in this study were 181 Americans who were recruited using the platform 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (hereafter Mturk).5 The sample consisted of 117 men, 61 women 
and 2 non-binary (1 participant did not indicate their sex) who ranged in age from 21 to 71 
years (Mean 39.15, Standard deviation 10.65).  
Fifty-seven percent (104) of the participants had graduated with a bachelor’s degree, while 
ten percent (19) had earned a master’s degree and two percent a doctoral degree (3). Twenty-
six percent (47) had high school diploma as their highest education. 6 
Sixty-eight percent (123) of the participants worked in the private sector, while twenty-nine 
percent (52) worked in the public sector. A total of three percent (6) declined to answer, 
answered as unemployed or that Mturk was their sole occupation.  
Forty-four percent (80) reported to be on the liberal side of the political spectrum, while 
thirty percent (54) reported to be on the conservative side. Twenty-six percent (47) reported 








5 A total of 191 participants completed the experiments, but 10 participants was eliminated from the sample after failing the 
manipulation check. All descriptive data and results are reported for the corrected sample. 
6 A total of 8 participant elected other educational option, and the most frequent response was associate degree. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive information on sample across conditions 
Condition 1 2 3 4 Total 
N 46 49 44 42 181 
Sex 
    
  
      Male 28 34 25 30 117 
      Female 18 15 17 11 61 





      Prefer not to say 
   
1 1 
  
    
  
Age 
    
  
       21-30 15 11 7 11 44 
       31-40 15 22 17 18 72 
       41-50 10 10 9 8 37 
       51-60 2 4 8 5 19 
       61-70 3 2 3 
 
8 
       71-80 1 
   
1 
  
    
  
Highest education 
    
  
      High School 14 10 10 13 47 
      Bachelor degree 21 31 27 25 104 
      Master's degree 8 5 4 2 19 
      PhD 1 1 0 1 3 
      Other 2 2 3 1 8 
  
    
  
Political standing 
    
  
      Liberal 18 21 19 22 80 
      Conservative 10 20 15 9 54 
      Middle position 18 8 10 11 47 




3.2 Experimental design 
3.2.1 Case, manipulation and procedure 
To test our hypotheses, we utilized a 2x2 between-subject design. Reporting decision and 
social distance were both manipulated at two levels: Self-reported transgressions/Journalist 
discovered transgressions, and Low social distance (USA)/High social distance (Mexico). 
7 
Participants were presented with a newspaper article about the money laundering 
transgressions of a fictious bank called “Dollar Bank”. We manipulated whether the article 
stated the bank had self-reported the money laundering transgressions to the authorities or 
whether Wall Street Journal had discovered and reported the transgressions. We also 
manipulated the location of the money laundering activity: either the branch office in San 
Diego (USA) or a Mexican subsidiary.  
 
After reading the newspaper article the participants were transferred to a screen where they 
read and responded to the dependent measure. Then followed screens for post-experimental 
measures and for descriptive questions before they were transferred to the end screen. 
3.2.2 Dependent measures 
To test our hypotheses participants had to answer five 10-point Likert scales to capture their 
attribution of intent, causation and blame, and their evaluation of moral wrongness and 
willingness to change bank affiliation: 
 
Blame: To what extent do you think Dollar Bank can be blamed for participating in the 
money laundering scheme? (1 («Not at all blameworthy”) to 10 (“Extremely blameworthy»)) 
 
Intent: To what extent do you think Dollar Bank intended to be part of the money laundering 
scheme? 1 («The bank definitely did not intend to be part of the money laundering scheme») 
to 10 («The bank definitely intended to be part of the money laundering scheme. »). 
 
7 See appendix for the instrument. 
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Causation: To what extent do you think Dollar Bank was responsible for the money 
laundering scheme? 1 («Not at all the cause») to 10 («Very much the cause»). 
 
Moral evaluation:  To what extent do you think Dollar Bank's actions as you read them in the 
previous section were morally defendable? 1 («The bank’s action was not morally 
defensible») to 10 («The bank’s action was morally defensible»).  
 
Willingness to change bank: Imagine that you have a customer relationship with Dollar 
Bank. Would you based on the provided information end your affiliation with the bank? 1 
(«Very unlikely») to 10 («Very likely»). 
 
3.2.3 Additional measures 
To measure moral identity, we utilize the ten-item moral identity scale developed by Aquino 
& Reed (2002).8  The authors propose that the self-importance of moral identity is composed 
by two dimensions. The first is the degree he degree to which moral traits are deeply rooted 
in the self-concept (internalization), and the second reflects the degree to which these moral 
traits manifest publicly through the person’s actions in the world (symbolization) (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Reed, Aquino & Levy, 2007). Participants answered the ten questions on Likert 
type items (1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”). The Cronbach alpha for the 
symbolization items was 0.872, and for the internalization items 0.778, with mean (standard 
deviation) of 3.27 (0.976) and 3.38 (0.392) respectively. We averaged the score across 
internalization items and symbolization items to arrive at the two measures for the self-
importance of moral identity for each participant. 
 
To provide further insight into how the participants perceived the bank’s actions we asked 
them to indicate whether they would describe the bank’s action as a 1) Act of omission, 2) 
Act of harm or 3) Other. In the third category they were prompted to write in their response.  
 
We measured participants attitudes towards banks and financial crime with four measures in 
the post experimental section of the experiment. This was done to capture the spontaneous 
evaluation of the culpable control model which theory suggest is heavily influenced by prior 
 
8 See appendix (section 8.2) for the scale with the ten items. 
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attitudes and beliefs and constitute our hypotheses 1c (Alicke, 2000). Attitude measure 1 
asked participants to report their trust in the US banking system on a 10-point Likert scale 
from 1 (“I have no trust”) to 10 (“I have absolute trust”). Attitude measure 2 asked 
participant to report the extent they felt US banks have an obligation to fight financial crime 
on a 10-point Likert scale from 1 (“No responsibility”) to 10 ("Extremely responsible”). 
Attitude measure 3 asked participant to report to what extent they believed money 
laundering activity through the American financial system was harmful to the US on a 10-
point Likert scale from 1 (“No harm”) to 10 (“Very harmful”). Attitude measure 4 asked 
participant to report to what extent they believed money laundering activity through the 
American financial system was harmful to the rest of the world on a 10-point Likert scale 
from 1 (“No harm”) to 10 (“Very harmful”). 
 
Lastly, we asked participants to report their political standing on a 7-point Likert-scale 
ranging from 1 (“Liberal”) to 7 (“Conservative). 9 
3.3 Data collection 
The survey was administered on Amazon Mechanical Turk using Qualtrics on May 5th, 2021 
and closed two days later. Every worker was awarded 5 USD for participating in the 
experiment. 
 
The number of participants was capped at 200, but due to technical difficulties with 
Qualtrics only 191 workers fully completed the experiment.  
 





See Table 2 for descriptive information (averages and standard deviation) on dependent 
variables and post-experimental measures of attitude across conditions. 
 
Condition 1: Journalist discovered and reported / No social distance 
Condition 2: Journalist discovered and reported / High social distance 
Condition 3: The bank self-reported / No social distance 
Condition 4: The bank self-reported / High social distance 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive information  
Conditions 1 2 3 4 
N 46 49 44 42 
  
   
  
Dependent variable - Averages (std.dev.) 
   
  
Intent 4.13 (3,12) 4.37 (3.17) 2.86 (2.78) 3.91 (3.09) 
Causation 5.70 (2.87) 6.04 (2.68) 4.61 (3.03) 5.60 (2.79) 
Blame 6.93 (2,14) 6.63 (2.52) 5.64 (3.02) 6.91 (1.85) 
Moral wrongness 3.39 (2.53) 4.35 (2.95) 5.07 (3.03) 4.95 (2.78) 
Willingness to change bank 5.89 (3.15) 5.86 (3.00) 4.59 (3.64) 4.64 (3.29) 
  
   
  
Post-experimental measures - Averages (std.dev.) 
  
  
Attitude 1: Trust in banks 4.22 (2.62) 4.94 (2.63) 5.41 (3.12) 4.24 (2.99) 
Attitude 2: Bank's responsibility to fight crime 7.74 (2.10) 7.76 (1.90) 8.02 (2.46) 7.95 (2.02) 
Attitude 3: Harm of money laundering in US 7.72 (2.22) 7.92 (1.64) 7.66 (2.05) 7.02 (2.24) 
Attitude 4: Harm of money laundering outside US 6.70 (2.06) 7.57 (1.90) 7.16 (2.07) 7.29 (2.08) 
Internalization (Moral identity)   3.33 (0.39)   3.38 (0.42)   3.46 (0.34)   3.33 (0.40)  
Symbolization (Moral identity)   3.17 (0.96)   3.43 (0.96)   3.26 (0.92)   3.21 (1.07) 
     
None of the post-experimental measures were significantly different across conditions.10   
 
10 Which indicates that our two manipulations did not affect our attitude or moral identity measures, reducing the threat of 
bias in our testing of hypothesis 1c, 3a and 3b. However, future research may want to pre-experimentally measure attitudes 
and make sure the conditions are balanced on attitude measures to further reduce the threat of confounds.  
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4.2 Testing Hypotheses  
4.2.1 Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c 
To test the hypothesis 1a, 1b and 1c we run a two-way ANOVA-model and linear regression 
models including covariates measured in the post-experimental section of our experiment.11 
12 13  
We do not find a significant main effect on the 5% level between the decision to self-report 
and attributed intent, F (1,177) = 4.56, p = .058. The main effect of decision to self-report on 
causation is not significant at the 5% level, F (1, 177) = 3.04, p = .083.  Participants’ prior 
attitudes towards the harm of financial crime will according to the culpable control model 
have a strong effect on attributed intent and causation (see hypotheses 1c). We therefor 
regress intent on our main independent variables and include our attitude measures as control 
variables (See Table 3). We observe that the effect of the bank’s reporting decision 
significantly impacts attributed intent, b = –.936, t(174) = -2.12, p < .05, but not causation. 
In sum, we find evidence for the effect of reporting choice on attributed intent but not on 
attributed causation.  
 
The main effect of the decision to self-report on blame is not significant on a 5% level, F(1, 
177) = 1.98, p = .1613. The linear regression model does not find a significant effect of 
reporting choice on attributed blame (see Table 3). As we did not hypothesize a direct effect 
of reporting choice on attribution of blame, but an indirect effect (mediation) through 
attribution of intent and causation, we conduct a simple mediation analysis using Hayes 
(2017) PROCESS-macro for SPSS to test the hypothesized direction of effects. Since we 
already have established that reporting choice do not affect attributed causation, we do not 
perform mediation analysis of this construct. We include the attitude measures 1-4 as control 
variables in the mediation model and find significant indirect effect between reporting choice 
 
11 Our main analysis in ANOVA are the main effects since we do not hypothesize an interaction with social distance.  
12 We do not use ANCOVA-models since the homogeneity assumption of ANCOVA is violated for all covariates across all 
subpopulations. However, test of linear regression assumptions reveals no strong violation of the assumption of 
homoscedasticity and the normality of residuals across the regression models used in this study. Furthermore, 
multicollinearity checks reveal no threats to our inferences. 
13 Our dependent measures are not normally distributed, but ANOVA are robust to this violation as our sample size across 
cells are near equal. Furthermore, Levene’s test rejected the assumption of homogeneity of variance across populations for 
our dependent measures. However, our sample is only slightly unevenly distributed, and the ANOVA-analysis is robust 
against violation of this assumption when the sample across cells is equal or near equal. We therefor proceed with ANOVA 
as our main analysis. 
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and attributed blame through attributed intent (See output in Section 6.1). In sum, our 
evidence for hypothesis 1b is mixed. We find the hypothesized effect of reporting choice on 
blame, but only a mediation effect through attributed intent and not through attributed 
causation. 
 
Hypotheses 1c predicts that prior attitudes towards the harm of money laundering will 
increase the likelihood of entering a blame validation mode where attribution of intent and 
causal role to the bank increases, which in turn increases the attribution of blame. We 
therefor perform mediation analysis to investigate whether our experimental data 
corresponds to the culpable control models predictions and our hypotheses 1c. We utilize the 
PROCESS-macro in SPSS developed by Andrew Hayes (2017) to run four mediation 
analysis where we as hypothesized test whether prior attitudes towards the harm of money 
laundering both impact attribution of blame directly and through its effect on attribution of 
intent and causation. 14 We find that there is a significant mediation effect for both attributed 
intention and causation across attitude measure 4, but only for attributed causation for 
attitude measure 3. The direct effect is significant in all cases. This provides strong evidence 
for the culpable control models prediction and hypotheses 1c.  
 
To sum up, the experiment allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
the bank’s decision to self-report money laundering transgressions or not, and attributed 
intent and blame. We further find significant evidence that participants prior attitudes 
towards the harm of money laundering transgressions leads to increased attribution of intent 
and causality to the bank which further increase the attribution of blame. In total, we find 
strong evidence for our hypotheses and the ability of the culpable control model to explain 
participants’ response to money laundering transgressions. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
We did not hypothesize an interaction between social distance and the bank’s reporting 
decision, as such our planned analysis was the main effect of social distance on attributed 
blame and evaluation of moral wrongness. The main effect of social distance on both 
 
14 See section 6.4 for a graphical illustration of the mediation models and the output. We do not hypothesize parallel 
mediation as the theory suggest that attribution of intent and causality are separate processes.  
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attributed blame and evaluation of moral wrongness is not significant, F(1, 173) = 1.62, p = 
.2048, and F(1, 173) = 1.00, p = .3179, respectively.  
 
To test the impact of political ideology we include participants self-reported political 
standing in the regression model and create an interaction term with social distance. 
Hypotheses 2b predict a significant interaction term, but neither was observed on both 
attributed blame and attributed moral wrongness. 
 
In sum, our experiment does not find evidence for hypothesis 2a and 2b. We therefore 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of social distance on attributed blame and 
evaluation of moral wrongness with regards to money laundering transgression. We can also 
not reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between social distance and political standing 
on attribution of blame and evaluation of moral wrongness. 
4.2.3 Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
To test hypothesis 3a we added our two measures of moral identity to our regression-model 
and used willingness to change bank as dependent variable. 
 
We find a significant effect of the symbolization component of moral identity on willingness 
to change bank affiliation, b = .898, t(168) = 3.40, p < .001, but not a significant effect of the 
internalization component. We therefor conclude that participants who were high 
symbolizers (i.e., indicating that their moral traits are reflecting in their actions) would be 
significantly more likely to change bank affiliation in line with hypotheses 3a.  
 
We then add two interaction terms between our moral identity measures and social distance 
to test hypotheses 3b with our regression-model. Both interaction terms are not significant. 
This provides support for hypotheses 3b which predicted no interaction between moral 
identity and social distance with regards to willingness to change bank affiliation.  
 
In sum, our experiment provide support for both hypotheses 3a and 3b. We can reject the 
null hypotheses of no interaction between the self-importance of moral identity and people’s 
willingness to change their bank affiliation after the discovery of money laundering 
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transgressions. In addition, our evidence also supports hypotheses 3b which predicted no 
interaction between participants’ moral identity and social distance. 
Table 3 – Regression output 
 
Model nr: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent var: Intent Causation Blame Wrongness Willingness to change 
bank affiliation 











 (-2.12) (-1.80) (-1.48) (3.08) (-2.77) (-2.78) 
       
Social distance 0.339 0.447 0.297 0.424 -0.196 -0.318 
 (0.77) (1.08) (0.89) (1.23) (-0.43) (-0.69) 
       




 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.49) (0.31) (-2.72) (5.50) (-0.14) (-0.11) 
       









 (-1.79) (-0.14) (3.41) (-3.33) (2.61) (2.85) 
       
Attitude 3 -0.168 0.0264 0.046 -0.282
**
 -0.007 -0.004 
 (-1.31) (0.22) (0.47) (-2.81) (-0.05) (-0.03) 












 (4.06) (3.66) (2.94) (0.34) (2.34) (2.57) 
       
Internalization     -0.0587 -0.061 
(Moral identity)     (-0.09) (-0.09) 
       





(Moral identity)     (3.40) (3.31) 
       
Political Ideology    0.317
**
  0.086 
    (3.27)  (0.67) 
       
Age      -0.041 
      (-1.86) 
       
Education      -0.201 
      (-0.82) 









 -1.307 -0.873 
 (2.80) (2.23) (3.07) (5.27) (-0.59) (-0.38) 
N 181 181 181 181 178 178 
R2 0.1282 0.1230 0.2205 0.4036 0.2241 0.2459 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.3 Additional analysis 
4.3.1 Consequences for the customer relationship  
We further investigated potential drivers of participants willingness to change their bank 
affiliation after the discovery of money laundering transgressions. These interactions where 
not hypothesized and should be viewed as exploratory analysis. We added education and age 
as variables to the regression-model (See Table 3). Our results reveal that most of the 
variation in willingness to change bank affiliation is driven by variables not captured in our 
experiment. 15  
 
First, we find that participants were significantly more likely to change their bank affiliation 
if the bank did not self-report the money laundering transgressions, b = -1.258, t(165) = -
2.78, p < .01. As expected, social distance did not significantly predict the willingness to 
change bank affiliation. We similarly did not find significant results for education, age, and 
political ideology (See Table 3). 
 
Second, we find that attitude measure 2 (Bank's responsibility to fight crime), b = 
.343, t(165) = 2.85, p < .01, and attitude measure 4 (Harm of money laundering outside US), 
b = .334, t(165) = 2.57, p < .05, significantly predict the willingness to change bank 
affiliation after money laundering transgressions. In sum, participants who indicated stronger 
beliefs in bank’s responsibility to fight crime, or stronger belief in the harmful effect of 
money laundering transgressions, was significantly more like change their bank affiliation. 
 
4.3.2 Act of omission or harm 
Most participants across conditions responded that the money laundering transgressions was 
an act of omission (73.48 percent) rather than an act of harm (15.47 percent). This is also 
mirrored in the answers in the “other” category, where the majority felt the bank to act with 
ignorance (a minority would state “willful ignorance”), carelessness or lack investment in 
 
15 With an R-square of 0.25, the model has little predictive value. 
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proper safeguards. Overall, participants’ answers reveal the perception that money 
laundering transgressions seems to require little intention and actions (causation) on part of 
the bank. Most participants seem to think the bank was not actively involved but rather 
ignorant to criminals using their services or lack the proper investments in safeguards. 
 
However, we find that the proportion of participant responding that the money laundering 
transgressions was an act of harm were significantly higher when journalist uncovered the 
transgressions, X2 (2, N = 181) = 6.699, p = .035. 16 This result indicate that participant was 
significantly more likely to think that the bank took a more active and damaging role in the 
money laundering transgressions if journalists discovered and reported the illegal activity, 




16 The proportions were not significantly different when social distance was high or low, X2 (2, N = 181) = 3.954, p = .138. 
 27 
5. Concluding discussion 
This study provides strong evidence for the culpable control model’s (Alicke, 2000) ability 
to explain the typical bank customers reaction to money laundering transgressions and 
reveals important insight into banks’ reputation costs related to money laundering. In a 
situation with only the evidence and understanding gained through a newspaper article, 
participants relied on cues for intent found in the presented information and their prior 
beliefs and attitudes about the harm of money laundering transgressions, when attributing 
blame to the bank. 
 
If the bank chose to self-report their actions to the authorities, they were significantly less 
blamed by the public. This effect was mediated by attributed intent, and our result do not 
reveal a direct effect of reporting choice on attributed blame. Since the actual money 
laundering activity was kept constant (except for location and reporting choice), this result 
reveals participants’ subtle use of cues to infer intent. Banks not choosing to come forward 
when discovering money laundering transgressions are perceived to act with more intent, 
and therefor receive more blame by the public. The results speak to the cost of secrecy for 
the bank, and the substantial benefit of the doubt received by the public for “owning your 
mistakes”. 
 
The study further reveals that participants’ prior attitudes and beliefs about the harm of 
money laundering had a significant impact on their attribution of blame for the 
transgressions both directly and through its effect on attributed intent and causation. This 
supports the culpable control model’s prediction that stronger prior attitudes towards the 
harmful consequences of money laundering activity may create a blame validation mode and 
lead to stronger attribution of blame to the bank. It further documents that prior attitudes may 
lead to attribute more knowledge (intent) to the bank for their role in the transgressions.  
 
We further find that participants moral identity as hypothesized significantly impact their 
willingness to change their bank affiliation after receiving the news of money laundering 
transgressions by their bank. While our model has low predictability with regards to 
explaining participants willingness to change their bank affiliation, it reveals the potential of 
a person’s moral identity as an explanatory variable with regards to ethical behaviour. As 
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such, this study contributes to this growing area which have found that moral identity can 
help explain charitable donations (Reed et al. 2007) and other prosocial behaviours (e.g., 
Hertz & Krettenauer 2016). Future research should dig deeper into other factors which may 
impact bank customers willingness to change bank affiliation after money laundering 
transgressions. 
 
We did not find an effect of social distance on attribution of blame, evaluation of moral 
wrongness or willingness to change bank affiliation. This could be due to the social distance 
between USA and Mexico not being large enough, or that the effect of social distance on 
judgment is more context dependent than anticipated. Future research should investigate 
whether e.g., increasing the social distance or the nature of the bank’s transgression, will 
reveal an effect between social distance and people’s judgment  
 
Lastly, the study had limitations which could limit the inferences that can be drawn from its 
result. First, Mturk-participants may not be representative of the population at large (e.g., 
Huff & Tingley 2015) and this study’s sample is not balanced with regards to age, sex and 
political standing which may limit both the internal and external validity of the findings. 
While we did not hypothesize an interaction with regards to age or sex, the sample’s 
imbalance with regards to our political measure may negatively affect our test of hypotheses 
2b. In addition, both imbalance on age, sex and political ideology may limit the 
generalizability of the result to the population at large. Second, our sample consist of only 
American citizens, and we cannot rule out that cultural norms with regards to the financial 
sector and criminal or social justice could impact the external validity of our results. Future 
studies should address this concern, and may for example include race, nationality, or 
ethnicity as a covariate to investigate whether there are heterogeneity effects across these 
variables.  
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6. Figures and output 
6.1 Mediation models and output 
Hypothesis 1b 
PROCESS-model 4 in the Hayes (2017) framework for mediation analysis: Simple 





Mediation analysis (Reporting choice -> Attributed intent -> Attributed blame, with attitude 














PROCESS-model 4 in the Hayes (2017) framework for mediation analysis: Simple 


















Mediation analysis (Attitude measure 3 -> Attributed intent -> Attributed blame) 
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8.1 Experimental material: Conditions 
Condition 1: Journalist report/Low social distance 
 
Dollar Bank under federal investigation  
 
Federal prosecutors are investigating Dollar Bank after Wall Street Journal reported of 
suspicious or illicit drug related money laundering transactions moved through its 
California branch in San Diego.  
 
The Wall Street Journal’s coverage have revealed that Dollar Bank transaction monitoring 
system and internal controls were inadequate to detect, identify, and report money 
laundering activity. In total, 50 billion dollars of drug money may have been laundered 
through the bank in the last decade alone, according to the Wall Street Journal. 
 
“We will cooperate fully with the government and understand the need for absolute vigilance 
in our efforts to protect against money laundering,” Dollar Bank’s spokeswoman Vicky 
Arnold said. 
 
Financial institutions such as banks, credit unions and casinos are required to establish 
effective anti-money laundering programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 
 
The BSA law also requires institutions to report any transactions bank employees deem 
suspicious and report movements of money involving at least $10,000. 
 
Banks have long complained that BSA requirements are costly and time-consuming for their 
employees who must file numerous reports with law enforcement. 
 
“Today an established and respected financial institution learned a valuable lesson about its 
legal responsibilities.” said the Drug Enforcement Administration in a public statement.  
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Condition 2: Journalist report/High social distance 
 
Dollar Bank under federal investigation  
 
Federal prosecutors are investigating Dollar Bank after Wall Street Journal reported of 
suspicious or illicit drug related money laundering transactions moved through its Mexican 
subsidiary. 
 
The Wall Street Journal’s coverage have revealed that Dollar Bank transaction monitoring 
system and internal controls were inadequate to detect, identify, and report money 
laundering activity. In total, 50 billion dollars of drug money may have been laundered 
through the bank in the last decade alone, according to the Wall Street Journal. 
 
“We will cooperate fully with the government and understand the need for absolute vigilance 
in our efforts to protect against money laundering,” Dollar Bank’s spokeswoman Vicky 
Arnold said. 
 
Financial institutions such as banks, credit unions and casinos are required to establish 
effective anti-money laundering programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 
 
The BSA law also requires institutions to report any transactions bank employees deem 
suspicious and report movements of money involving at least $10,000. 
 
Banks have long complained that BSA requirements are costly and time-consuming for their 
employees who must file numerous reports with law enforcement. 
“Today an established and respected financial institution learned a valuable lesson about its 









Condition 3: Self-reported/Low social distance 
 
Dollar Bank under federal investigation  
 
Federal prosecutors are investigating Dollar Bank after the bank reported suspicious or 
illicit drug related money laundering transactions moved through its California branch in 
San Diego.  
 
Dollar Bank have reported to regulators that their monitoring system and internal controls 
were inadequate to detect, identify, and report money laundering activity. In total, and 
according to the bank’s own record, 50 billion dollars of drug money may have been 
laundered through the bank in the last decade alone. 
 
“We will cooperate fully with the government and understand the need for absolute vigilance 
in our efforts to protect against money laundering,” Dollar Bank’s spokeswoman Vicky 
Arnold said. 
 
Financial institutions such as banks, credit unions and casinos are required to establish 
effective anti-money laundering programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 
 
The BSA law also requires institutions to report any transactions bank employees deem 
suspicious and report movements of money involving at least $10,000. 
 
Banks have long complained that BSA requirements are costly and time-consuming for their 
employees who must file numerous reports with law enforcement. 
 
“Today an established and respected financial institution learned a valuable lesson about its 








Condition 4: Self-reported/High social distance 
 
Dollar Bank under federal investigation  
 
Federal prosecutors are investigating Dollar Bank after the bank reported suspicious or 
illicit drug related money laundering transactions moved through its Mexican subsidiary. 
 
Dollar Bank have reported to regulators that their monitoring system and internal controls 
were inadequate to detect, identify, and report money laundering activity. In total, and 
according to the bank’s own record, 50 billion dollars of drug money may have been 
laundered through the bank in the last decade alone. 
 
“We will cooperate fully with the government and understand the need for absolute vigilance 
in our efforts to protect against money laundering,” Dollar Bank’s spokeswoman Vicky 
Arnold said. 
 
Financial institutions such as banks, credit unions and casinos are required to establish 
effective anti-money laundering programs under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). 
 
The BSA law also requires institutions to report any transactions bank employees deem 
suspicious and report movements of money involving at least $10,000. 
 
Banks have long complained that BSA requirements are costly and time-consuming for their 
employees who must file numerous reports with law enforcement. 
 
“Today an established and respected financial institution learned a valuable lesson about its 









8.2 Moral identity scale 
The moral identity scale as developed by Aquino & Reed (2002): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
